Chart 1 from the The uranium renaissance shock: can supply keep up? analysisMOLUSCCAOpen Analysis
Forecasting experiment · Uranium · OECD NEA / IAEA Red Book and WNA data

The uranium
renaissance shock

Nuclear power has violently returned to favour, driven by decarbonisation and the electricity appetite of AI data centres. We took the real resource, production and requirement data and asked the only two questions that matter: is there enough uranium, and can it be mined in time.

The short answer: there is plenty of uranium in the ground and not nearly enough coming out of it. Mine production has fallen short of reactor requirements in 10 of the last 11 years, and the shortfall has been quietly covered by finite stockpiles. That is the opposite of the lithium story, and it is why this shock behaves differently.
The price

Fifteen years of neglect, then a violent repricing

2007 peak
$136
per lb, all-time high
2016-17 trough
$18
below most production costs
Jan 2024 spot
$106
17-year high
Long-term, 2026
$91.5
18-year high
Chart 2 from the The uranium renaissance shock: can supply keep up? analysis
Annual average spot price, IMF primary commodity data with documented peaks. After Fukushima the price sat below the cost of production for most of a decade, which is the direct cause of today's supply problem.
The core finding

The world has been eating its stockpile

This is the chart that matters, and it is the one most coverage of the uranium story leaves out.

Chart 3 from the The uranium renaissance shock: can supply keep up? analysis
Mine production against reactor requirements. Production has been below requirements in 10 of 11 observed years. The shaded area is met by secondary supply: commercial and government stockpiles, reprocessed material, and re-enriched tails.
Cumulative shortfall
83 kt
tonnes U, 2010 to 2025
Versus inventories
0.56x
of reported commercial stock
2025 coverage
91%
of requirements met by mines
Reported inventories
147 kt
US, EU and East Asia combined
YearMine production (ktU)Requirements (ktU)GapCoverage
201054.063.0+9.086%
201258.461.6+3.295%
201456.256.0-0.2100%
201662.162.8+0.799%
201853.559.2+5.790%
202047.762.1+14.477%
202148.362.5+14.277%
202249.463.5+14.178%
202354.865.1+10.384%
202460.265.7+5.492%
202563.068.9+5.991%
Why this is different from lithium

When we ran the same exercise on lithium, reserves had nearly tripled while production grew tenfold. There was no shortage, only a timing problem, and the market was in surplus.

Uranium is the mirror image. Resources are ample, but the market has run a primary production deficit for over a decade, plugged by drawing down stockpiles that were built in a different era. Secondary supply is the only reason the lights stayed on, and it is finite by definition. Two commodities, both essential to the energy transition, with completely opposite supply structures. The lesson is that "critical mineral" is not a risk category. Each one has to be modelled on its own mechanism.

The resource question

Is the world running out? No. And that is not the point.

The Red Book puts identified recoverable resources at 7.9 million tonnes of uranium below USD 130 per kgU. Whether that is a lot depends entirely on a number nobody knows.

Chart 4 from the The uranium renaissance shock: can supply keep up? analysis
Years of supply from identified resources, at four different demand levels. The same 7.9 Mt is either 125 years of comfort or 39 years of scarcity, depending purely on how fast the reactor fleet grows.
The number that should make you cautious

Reactor requirements grew at 0.68% a year between 2010 and 2025. The World Nuclear Association's reference scenario for 2040 implies 5.32% a year from here. That is roughly an eightfold acceleration in the growth rate, and it has not happened yet.

Every bullish uranium forecast, including the optimistic half of ours, is really a bet that this acceleration arrives. Be suspicious of anyone who states it as fact rather than as the assumption doing all the work.

The honesty test

Could a model have called this?

Before forecasting forward, we checked whether a reasonable trend model fitted to the pre-boom era could have anticipated the renaissance.

Chart 5 from the The uranium renaissance shock: can supply keep up? analysis
A log-linear trend fitted on 2003 to 2020, predicting blind. It expected roughly $31 a pound for 2026. The actual figure is around $78, an error of 61%. MAPE across the window was 37%.
YearPredictedActualError
2021$32$33-2%
2022$32$41-22%
2023$32$49-36%
2024$31$70-55%
2025$31$59-47%
2026$31$78-61%
What this says about the forecast below

A model calibrated on a decade of depressed prices was confidently, consistently wrong once policy and sentiment turned. It could not see a regime change, because regime changes do not appear in the history you fit to. Read our numbers knowing exactly what happened to the last person who extrapolated this market.

The model

Why we modelled the fuel cycle, not the price chart

Fitting a curve to price history assumes the past pattern continues. For a commodity with a decade-long development cycle that is the wrong shape entirely, so we modelled the physical market.

demand(t) = reactor requirements, compounding at an uncertain rate supply(t) = mine supply(t-1) x growth( price(t-10) / incentive price ) + secondary supply, decaying as stockpiles deplete price(t) = incentive price x (demand / supply) ^ 1.85

The critical term is the ten-year lag. A uranium mine takes roughly a decade from discovery to production, and longer where permitting is contested. So the supply response to today's price does not arrive until the late 2030s. That single delay is what turns a demand surge into a sustained price event rather than a brief spike.

Secondary supply is modelled as a declining contribution, because stockpiles, weapons downblending and enrichment tails are drawdowns, not renewable sources. The tighter the market gets, the less of a cushion remains.

The forecast

Twenty thousand paths to 2050

Chart 6 from the The uranium renaissance shock: can supply keep up? analysis
Historical price and the simulated forward distribution. The median rises through the 2030s as the deficit bites, peaks around 2040, then eases as delayed mine supply finally arrives. That arc is the ten-year lag working itself out.
YearMedian price80% bandDemandGapP(deficit)
2030$89$60 to $13281 kt+4.6 kt72%
2035$123$71 to $21496 kt+19.7 kt88%
2040$160$85 to $260113 kt+35.2 kt95%
2045$138$82 to $236134 kt+33.5 kt95%
2050$83$48 to $142158 kt+2.2 kt53%
Chart 7 from the The uranium renaissance shock: can supply keep up? analysis
Requirements against total available supply. The shaded region is demand that mines and stockpiles together cannot meet at the median.
P(above $150/lb)
90%
at some point before 2050
P(above $200/lb)
67%
at some point before 2050
P(below $40/lb)
10%
a return to the 2016 world
P(deficit in 2040)
95%
supply still short
Reading these numbers honestly

The asymmetry is the finding. A 90% chance of exceeding $150 against a 10% chance of falling below $40 is not a forecast of a particular price. It is a statement that the downside is largely closed off, because a market already producing less than it consumes cannot easily flood itself.

Note also that the median falls back after 2040. That is not the deficit resolving painlessly. It is a decade of high prices finally dragging enough supply into existence, which is exactly how mining cycles end.

Try it yourself

Move the two assumptions that decide everything

Reactor demand growth and mine development lead time. Everything else is detail.

Balance in 2040
deficit
requirements against available supply

Simplified version of the model above, running live. Deficit means the market must draw down stockpiles or bid the price up.

Scenarios

Six futures

Scenario2035 median2050 median2040 gapP(above $150)
Base case$124$82+36 kt90%
AI datacentre boom (demand 7.5%/yr)$254$106+115 kt100%
Slow build (demand 2.5%/yr)$105$83+24 kt89%
Faster mine response (6yr lead)$123$75+21 kt82%
Secondary supply collapses (-15%/yr)$139$64+39 kt91%
Higher incentive price ($110/lb)$260$95+58 kt100%
Reading the table

Only one lever meaningfully closes the gap, and it is not price. Faster mine development, cutting the lead time from ten years to six, does more to soften the 2040 shortfall than any demand assumption. This is a permitting and capital-allocation problem wearing the costume of a geology problem.

Note the AI data centre scenario. Demand at 7.5% a year produces a severe 2035 price but a lower 2050 price than you might expect, because an extreme early signal pulls forward an enormous supply response. Shocks in mined commodities tend to overcorrect.

Conclusion

Not a shortage of uranium. A shortage of mines.

Three things we are confident about, and one we are not.

The resource is not the constraint. Identified recoverable resources of 7.9 Mt cover our entire modelled demand to 2050 roughly three times over. Cumulative demand from 2027 to 2050 comes to 2.79 Mt, around 35% of what is already identified.

The deficit is real and it is structural. Ten of the last eleven years produced less than the reactor fleet consumed. That gap was filled by stockpiles built for a world with more weapons and fewer reactors. It is a one-time inheritance being spent.

The lag is the whole story. A decade between investment and production means today's price cannot fix this decade's problem. It can only fix the 2040s.

What we are not confident about: the demand path. The entire bullish case rests on reactor growth accelerating roughly eightfold from its fifteen-year trend. It may well happen, and AI power demand is a genuine new driver. But it has not happened yet, and a forecast that treats it as settled is selling you a conclusion rather than an analysis.

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